David Colemen Headley Sentenced to 35 Years in Prison for Role in India and Denmark Terror Plots

WASHINGTON—David Coleman Headley, a U.S. citizen partly of Pakistani descent, was sentenced today to 35 years in prison for a dozen federal terrorism crimes relating to his role in planning the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, and a subsequent proposed attack on a newspaper in Denmark. Headley pleaded guilty in March 2010 to all 12 counts that were brought against him following his arrest in October 2009 as he was about to leave the country. Immediately after his arrest, Headley began cooperating with authorities.
Headley, 52, was ordered to serve 35 years, followed by five years of supervised release by U.S. District Judge Harry Leinenweber. There is no federal parole and defendants must serve at least 85 percent of their sentence. “Mr. Headley is a terrorist,” Judge Leinenweber said in imposing the sentence.
“There is little question that life imprisonment would be an appropriate punishment for Headley’s incredibly serious crimes but for the significant value provided by his immediate and extensive cooperation,” the government argued in seeking a sentence of 30 to 35 years.
In pleading guilty and later testifying for the government at the trial of a co-defendant, Headley admitted that he attended training camps in Pakistan operated by Lashkar e Tayyiba, a terrorist organization operating in that country, on five separate occasions between 2002 and 2005. In late 2005, Headley received instructions from three members of Lashkar to travel to India to conduct surveillance, which he did five times leading up to the Mumbai attacks in 2008 that killed approximately 164 people, including six Americans, and wounded hundreds more. Headley’s plea agreement in March 2010 stated that he “has provided substantial assistance to the criminal investigation and also has provided information of significant intelligence value.”
In consideration of Headley’s past cooperation and anticipated future cooperation, which would include debriefings for the purpose of gathering intelligence and national security information, as well as testifying in any foreign judicial proceedings held in the United States by way of deposition, video-conferencing or letters rogatory, the Attorney General of the United States authorized the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Chicago not to seek the death penalty.
“Today’s sentence is an important milestone in our continuing efforts to hold accountable those responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attacks and to achieve justice for the victims. Our investigations into Mumbai attacks and the Denmark terror plot are ongoing and active. I thank the many agents, analysts, and prosecutors responsible for this investigation and prosecution,” said Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security.
Headley was convicted of conspiracy to bomb public places in India; conspiracy to murder and maim persons in India; six counts of aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. citizens in India; conspiracy to provide material support to terrorism in India; conspiracy to murder and maim persons in Denmark; conspiracy to provide material support to terrorism in Denmark; and conspiracy to provide material support to Lashkar.
According to Headley’s guilty plea and testimony, he attended the following training camps operated by Lashkar: a three-week course starting in February 2002 that provided indoctrination on the merits of waging jihad; a three-week course starting in August 2002 that provided training in the use of weapons and grenades; a three-month course starting in April 2003 that taught close combat tactics, the use of weapons and grenades and survival skills; a three-week course starting in August 2003 that taught counter-surveillance skills; and a three-month course starting in December 2003 that provided combat and tactical training.
Mumbai Terror Attacks
After receiving instructions in late 2005 to conduct surveillance in India, Headley changed his given name from Daood Gilani in February 2006 in Philadelphia to facilitate his activities on behalf of Lashkar by portraying himself in India as an American who was neither Muslim nor Pakistani. In the early summer of 2006, Headley and two Lashkar members discussed opening an immigration office in Mumbai as a cover for his surveillance activities.
Headley eventually made five extended trips to Mumbai—in September 2006, February and September 2007, and April and July 2008—each time making videotapes of various potential targets, including those attacked in November 2008. Before each trip, Lashkar members and associates instructed Headley regarding specific locations where he was to conduct surveillance. After each trip, Headley traveled to Pakistan to meet with Lashkar members and associates, report on the results of his surveillance, and provide the surveillance videos.
Before the April 2008 surveillance trip, Headley and co-conspirators in Pakistan discussed potential landing sites in Mumbai for a team of attackers who would arrive by sea. Headley returned to Mumbai with a global positioning system device and took boat trips around the Mumbai harbor and entered various locations into the device.
Between November 26 and 28, 2008, 10 attackers trained by Lashkar carried out multiple assaults with firearms, grenades, and improvised explosive devices against multiple targets in Mumbai, including the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels, the Leopold Café, the Chabad House, and the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus train station, each of which Headley had scouted in advance, killing approximately 164 victims and wounding hundreds more.
The six Americans killed during the siege were Ben Zion Chroman, Gavriel Holtzberg, Sandeep Jeswani, Alan Scherr, his daughter Naomi Scherr, and Aryeh Leibish Teitelbaum.
In March 2009, Headley made a sixth trip to India to conduct additional surveillance, including of the National Defense College in Delhi, and of Chabad Houses in several cities.
Denmark Terror Plot
Regarding the Denmark terror plot, Headley admitted and testified that in early November 2008, he was instructed by a Lashkar member in Pakistan, to conduct surveillance of the Copenhagen and Aarhus offices of the Danish newspaper Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten in preparation for an attack in retaliation for the newspaper’s publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed. After this meeting, Headley informed co-defendant Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed (Abdur Rehman), also known as “Pasha,” of his assignment. Abdur Rehman told Headley words to the effect that if Lashkar did not go through with the attack, Abdur Rehman knew someone who would. Although not identified by name at the time, Headley later learned this individual was co-defendant Ilyas Kashmiri. Abdur Rehman previously told Headley that he was working with Kashmiri and that Kashmiri was in direct contact with a senior leader of al Qaeda.
While in Chicago in late December 2008 and early January 2009, Headley exchanged e-mails with Abdur Rehman to continue planning for the attack and to coordinate his travel to Denmark to conduct surveillance. In January 2009, at Lashkar’s direction, Headley traveled from Chicago to Copenhagen to conduct surveillance of the Jyllands-Posten newspaper offices in Copenhagen and Aarhus and scouted and videotaped the surrounding areas.
In late January 2009, Headley met separately with Abdur Rehman and a Lashkar member in Pakistan, discussed the planned attack on the newspaper, and provided them with videos of his surveillance. About the same time, Abdur Rehman provided Headley a video produced by the media wing of al Qaeda in approximately August 2008, which claimed credit for the June 2008 attack on the Danish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, and called for further attacks against Danish interests to avenge the publication of the offending cartoons.
In February 2009, Headley and Abdur Rehman met with Kashmiri in the Waziristan region of Pakistan, where they discussed the video surveillance and ways to carry out the attack. Kashmiri told Headley that he could provide manpower for the operation and that Lashkar’s participation was not necessary. In March 2009, a Lashkar member advised Headley that Lashkar put the newspaper attack on hold because of pressure resulting from the Mumbai attacks. In May 2009, Headley and Abdur Rehman again met with Kashmiri in Waziristan. Kashmiri told Headley to meet with a European contact who could provide Headley with money, weapons and manpower for the Denmark attack and relate Kashmiri’s instructions that this should be a suicide attack and the attackers should prepare martyrdom videos beforehand. Kashmiri also stated that the attackers should behead captives and throw their heads on to the street in Copenhagen to heighten the response from Danish authorities, and added that the “elders,” whom Headley understood to be al Qaeda leadership, wanted the attack to happen as soon as possible.
In late July and early August 2009, Headley traveled from Chicago to various places in Europe and met with and attempted to obtain assistance from Kashmiri’s contacts and, while in Copenhagen, he made approximately 13 additional surveillance videos. When he returned to the United States on August 5, 2009, Headley falsely told a U.S. Customs and Border Protection inspector in Atlanta that he had visited Europe for business reasons. On October 3, 2009, Headley was arrested at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago, intending ultimately to travel to Pakistan to deliver the approximately 13 surveillance videos to Abdur Rehman and Kashmiri.
One of Headley’s co-defendants, Tahawwur Rana, 52, of Chicago, was sentenced last week to 14 years in prison for conspiracy to provide material support to the Denmark terror plot and providing material support to Lashkar. Headley testified for the government at Rana’s trial in June 2011.
The government is being represented by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Daniel Collins and Sarah E. Streicker, with assistance from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. Federal prosecutors in Los Angeles have worked on a broader investigation of the Mumbai attacks. The investigation was conducted by the Chicago Joint Terrorism Task Force, led by the Chicago Office of the FBI, with assistance from FBI offices in Los Angeles, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., as well as both U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations.

Stopping a Would-Be Terrorist

The 20-year-old Saudi Arabian man living in Lubbock, Texas was intent on waging jihad against Americans—possibly even a former U.S. president—and he was one ingredient away from being able to build a powerful bomb.
But Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari’s deadly plans began to unravel when a shipping company’s suspicions were raised—illustrating once again how the FBI relies on private industry and the general public in the fight against terror.

	Setting Tripwires The FBI depends on private industry and the general public to help fight terrorism. Weapons of mass destruction coordinators in each of the 56 FBI field offices, along with other agents, regularly meet with representatives from industry and academic institutions, public health officials, local law enforcement, and first responders to raise awareness about threats to our national security. These efforts are known as setting tripwires, and the intent is to establish an early-warning network where those closest to an emerging situation—such as the Lubbock shipping company in the Aldawsari case—are aware of potential risks and are prepared to inform the FBI when suspicions are raised. “If not for those established tripwires and the liaison with the local police department—and them making the right decision to notify the FBI—I shudder to think what might have happened in the Aldawsari case,” said Special Agent Frazier Thompson. “If Aldawsari was able to get the phenol, there is no doubt in my mind he would have manufactured a very potent explosive device.” Thompson added, “Establishing and maintaining tripwires is critical to our national security, and the cooperation we received across the board on the Aldawsari case proved it.”

In early February 2011, a Lubbock shipping firm received a package from a North Carolina chemical company containing 10 bottles of phenol intended for Aldawsari. Combined with just two other chemicals, phenol can be used to make a potent explosive. Delivering such poisonous chemicals to an individual’s home is not common, so the shipping company contacted the North Carolina firm. Both decided that the phenol should not be delivered and that local law enforcement should be alerted. A Lubbock Police Department officer was called to the scene.
“That officer and his supervisor—because of their relationship with the FBI (see sidebar)—decided that this was something we needed to know about,” said Special Agent Frazier Thompson, who works in our Dallas Division. “Our initial focus was to identify Aldawsari to see if he had a legitimate reason for purchasing phenol.”
In a matter of days, members of our North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force learned that although Aldawsari had once been a chemical engineering student at Texas Tech, he was no longer enrolled there and had no affiliation with the university.
“He was trying to pass himself off as a Texas Tech student doing research on cleaning products,” said Special Agent Mike Orndorff, who worked the investigation. “Those credentials, if legitimate, would have allowed him to buy the phenol.”
Most alarming was that Aldawsari had already purchased the two other chemicals needed to make his bomb, along with test tubes, beakers, and protective gear. Through covert operations, investigators learned he had disassembled clocks and cell phones and stripped the wires off Christmas lights in apparent attempts to fashion timers and initiating devices.

Evidence of Aldawsari’s attempts to fashion timers and initiating devices.

“His apartment bedroom was basically a storage room where he kept his chemicals and equipment,” Thompson said. “He was sleeping in the living room on the couch or the floor.”
The investigation revealed troubling things about Aldawsari, who had come to the U.S. legally in 2008 on a student visa. “Based on evidence from the Internet and his journal entries,” Thompson said, “Aldawsari was radicalized before he ever came to the U.S. It appears he started planning this attack when he was a teenager and sought a scholarship to study specifically in America.”
By this point, surveillance teams were monitoring Aldawsari around the clock. “He was searching online for large targets such as dams and electrical plants,” Thompson said. He also searched for ways to conceal explosives in baby dolls and carriages and even sought the Texas address of former President George W. Bush.
On February 23, 2011, after agents were certain that Aldawsari was working alone, he was arrested and charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. In November, after being convicted by a jury, he was sentenced to life in prison.
“Aldawsari wanted to take out a lot of people,” Thompson said. “It scares me to think what might have happened if we hadn’t stopped him.”

North to Alaska Part 4: The Shot that Pierced the Alaska Pipeline

Located less than 200 miles from the Arctic Circle, our resident agency in Fairbanks is one of the FBI’s most remote offices—but its three investigators cover an expansive amount of territory and help safeguard some of the country’s most valuable infrastructure.
Within the office’s area of responsibility is the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, an 800-mile engineering marvel that has carried billions of gallons of crude oil from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez since it began pumping in 1977.
“For as long and as exposed as the pipeline is, it is definitely not a soft target on the ground or in the air,” said Special Agent Bruce Milne. That’s because the pipeline’s owner, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, provides extensive security and maintains strong ties with local and federal law enforcement.

	FBI Agent and Dog Musher Special Agent Bruce Milne has spent 25 years in the FBI, and most of that time has been in Fairbanks—Alaska’s second largest city with about 32,000 residents. “Inside the city limits it’s like any other small town,” he said, “but go 10 minutes out of town and it’s just about complete wilderness.” Even though winter temperatures can plummet to 60-below zero and highway signs caution drivers to beware of moose, Milne is happy to be in Fairbanks because he has a passion for training and racing sled dogs. Alaskans call it “mushing,” and Milne has done more than his share. In 2007, the Boston native competed in the famous Iditarod—known as “the last great race”—and he has also raced multiple times in the equally grueling Yukon Quest. The Iditarod begins in Anchorage each year on the first day of March and ends more than 1,000 miles away in Nome. It is an extreme test of skill and endurance, pitting man and his dog team against the elements and the clock. “Being known in dog mushing circles has helped me as an FBI agent,” Milne said. “The residents here appreciate the fact that I am a member of their community, not just somebody who will leave after a few years.”

“We all take the security of the pipeline very seriously,” said Milne, a 25-year FBI veteran who was drawn to Alaska in part because of his interest in dog sledding (see sidebar). “Our Joint Terrorism Task Force coordinates closely with Alyeska and Alaska State Troopers to protect the pipeline,” he added.
One case that stands out for Milne occurred in October 2001, when a resident of Livengood—a town of less than two dozen people about 50 miles north of Fairbanks—shot a hole in the pipeline with a high-powered rifle.
A bullet would not ordinarily breach the pipeline’s exterior, which is constructed of thick steel and lined inside with several inches of high-density insulation. But the single shot from Daniel Lewis’ rifle somehow did penetrate the pipeline, and oil began streaming out with tremendous force. “If you would have put your hand in front of the leak,” Milne said, “the pressure would have taken it off.”
Lewis, described later in court as a career criminal, had been released from jail only weeks before the shooting incident. He was detained by troopers after he and his brother were spotted near the spill.
Milne and his colleague, Special Agent Mark Terra, were called in to investigate. They recovered the rifle—the scope had blood on it where it had recoiled against Lewis’ face—made plaster foot casts at the crime scene, and began interviewing people who knew the Lewis brothers. “Alyeska security and local troopers did a tremendous amount of work on this case as well,” Milne said.
Meanwhile, oil spewed from the pipeline for days before engineers could stop it. More than 285,000 gallons of crude were spilled as a result of that small bullet hole and—according to press reports at the time—the cleanup took many months and cost $13 million.

A stretch of the 800-mile Trans-Alaska Pipeline.

Lewis was charged with a range of federal and state crimes, from weapons offenses to oil pollution, criminal mischief, and driving while intoxicated. In 2002 he received a 10-year federal sentence; the following year in state court, he was sentenced to 16 years in prison. His sentences are running concurrently.
Coming less than a month after the 9/11 terror attacks, the pipeline shooting served as a reminder that protecting the country—whether from terrorists or other criminals—requires constant vigilance. “Everyone here recognizes that the stakes are as high in Alaska as anywhere else,” Milne said. “That’s why we work so closely with our partners to maintain the highest level of security.”

North to Alaska Part 3: A Domestic Terrorist With a Deadly Plan

By the time he moved to Alaska in 2006, Paul Rockwood, Jr. was an ardent follower of the American-born radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who he met at a Virginia mosque in late 2001.
Shortly after he settled with his family in the small fishing village of King Salmon to work for the National Weather Service, our agents in Anchorage were aware that Rockwood had begun compiling a list of targets in the U.S. military he might assassinate in the name of jihad.
“If you were wearing a U.S. military uniform,” said Special Agent Doug Klein, who worked the case from Anchorage, “as far as Rockwood was concerned, you were a target.”
A military veteran himself, Rockwood believed it was his religious duty to kill those who desecrated Islam. In 2009, he began sharing his deadly plans with an individual he thought held similar views. But that person was actually an undercover operative employed by our Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Anchorage.
For a time, JTTF personnel wondered how determined Rockwood was about his plans. “But one day when he was with our undercover in Anchorage he identified the building of a cleared defense contractor and said, ‘This is the kind of building I want to blow up,’ ” Klein said. “That’s when we knew he was a serious threat.”
Keeping track of Rockwood was difficult, however, because King Salmon is some 300 miles from Anchorage and only accessible by airplane. And with only a few hundred residents, outsiders would be immediately spotted, so attempts at surveillance were impractical. “We couldn’t use 90 percent of the traditional investigative techniques we use in the Lower 48,” Klein explained.
In addition, small, regional airlines in Alaska are not regulated by the Transportation Security Administration, so anyone can fly with weapons. On Rockwood’s frequent trips from King Salmon to Anchorage, Klein said, “he could have had a gun or a bomb and we never would have known.”
During those Anchorage visits, Rockwood met the undercover operative and discussed buying electronics and downloading schematics of cell phones to make bomb detonators. At one meeting, he said he was getting ready to relocate to the mainland and had plans to steal a cache of explosives in Boston—where he grew up—that would help him go operational.
By early 2010, Rockwood had formalized his hit list to include 15 specific targets—all outside Alaska—and he gave the list to his wife, Nadia, who was aware of his intentions.
Even with no overt acts of terrorism to charge him with, it was decided that for the sake of public safety, Rockwood and his wife could not be allowed to leave Alaska. In May 2010, JTTF agents questioned Rockwood and his wife as they attempted to fly out of Anchorage. Both denied any involvement with a hit list or terrorist plot.
The couple was charged with making false statements to the FBI in a domestic terrorism investigation, and in July, Rockwood was found guilty and sentenced to eight years in prison—the maximum sentence under the law. His wife was also found guilty and received five years of probation.
“We can never be sure if he would have acted,” Klein said, “but Rockwood was clearly a threat, not only to the individuals on his list but to the entire community.”

North to Alaska Part 2: An Explosive Situation in the Dead of Winter

The call came in to the Anchorage Field Office early on a Sunday morning in January 2010. An explosion had taken place at a Fairbanks residence, and a 21-year-old man had been seriously injured.
After consulting with local authorities on the scene, our weapons of mass destruction (WMD) coordinator and other FBI personnel were not sure if the explosion was related to a drug manufacturing operation or linked to a terrorism threat. But everyone understood that our assistance was required, because the house contained a variety of hazardous, unstable materials.
Members of our Evidence Response Team (ERT), the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and others from the Anchorage office gathered their equipment and prepared to drive to Fairbanks—365 miles to the north—in the middle of a violent winter storm.
“It was 58 degrees below zero, with high winds, blizzard conditions, and black ice on the highway,” said Special Agent Derek Espeland, the WMD coordinator who is also one of Anchorage’s two special agent bomb technicians.
Based on the description of materials in the house, agents initially thought the man was making methamphetamine—meth labs are an unfortunate reality in many rural communities. The victim, who walked to a nearby fire station despite the sub-zero temperature, was burned and bleeding. He claimed he was building a rocket when it blew up. Before he could be questioned further, he was flown to a burn unit in Seattle for treatment.
After a harrowing drive from Anchorage that took more than seven hours, FBI personnel arrived on scene along with bomb techs from the Air Force and local law enforcement. The meth lab theory was ruled out, “but then you almost had to conclude that the guy could be a terrorist,” Espeland said. “Everything we saw in the house we had seen being used by terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
As it turns out, the 21-year-old was neither a drug maker nor a terrorist. He was just fascinated with explosives and blowing things up. He had legally purchased all his ingredients—of course, our agents didn’t know that at the time. And because the house was a public safety threat, Espeland said, “we couldn’t just walk away.”
To neutralize the threat, it was decided to employ several render-safe techniques using specialized equipment. But that was easier said than done. Robots and other battery-powered equipment were inoperable in the nearly 60-below temperature because the batteries were frozen. Espeland’s evidence camera froze to his face when he tried to take a picture—inside the house. Vehicles had to be kept running for fear they would freeze if turned off, even with warming blankets and engine block heaters. An extension cord designed for extreme cold snapped and disintegrated.
“The cold was drier than anything I ever felt before,” said Vicky Grimes, an ERT member. “It almost took your breath away.”
A command post was established at the nearby fire station, and after a joint effort, the house was finally rendered safe. “Responding to this incident reinforced our understanding that we have to rely on our state and local partners for assistance, just as they rely on us,” said Special Agent Sandra Klein, Anchorage’s JTTF supervisor.
The 21-year-old recovered from his injuries, and—since he had committed no federal crimes—was not charged. “This was a public safety threat that could have been something far more serious,” Espeland said. “That’s why we responded, despite the conditions. That’s what we’re here for.”